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CONTRACT INTERPRETATION PROBLEMS
AND THE DUAL OPTION LEASE
Many domestic fuel oil companies have made a practice of leasing land
from private owners for the operation of local filling stations. Generally,
the leases are long termi agreements prepared by the lessee-oil company
on a standard form giving the company both an option to purchase the
leased realty for a specified fixed price2 and an option to exercise first
refusal rights.3 The use of these dual purchase option provisions has
provided a source of interesting litigation in recent years. Judicial in-
terpretation of the inter-relation of the two provisions has yielded re-
markably inconsistent results due to a fundamental divergence of
attitudes toward the dual option lease. This Comment will compare the
different judicial interpretations of the clauses and will suggest that one
view is clearly superior to the other.
1. The average term for leases of this type appears to be about 10 years. Additionally,
many service station leases grant the lessee an option to renew the lease for some period
shorter than or equal to the iitial term. See, e.g, Texaco, Inc. v. Rogow, 150 Conn.
401, 190 A.2d 48 (1963) (10-year lease with no provision for renewal); Cities Service Oil
Co. v. Viering, 404 Ill. 538, 89 N.E.2d 392 (1949) (six-year lease with option to renew
for additional five years); Imperial Refineries Corp. v. Morrissey, 254 Iowa 934, 119
N.W2d 872 (1963) (seven-year lease with option to renew for additional four years).
2. For the sake of clarity, this common provision hereafter will be referred to as .a
fixed price option to purchase the leased premises. The provision which appeared in
Shell Oil v. Prescott, 398 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1968) is typical:
Thirteenth: At any time during the term of the lease or any extension or
renewal, [lessee] Shell shall have the option to purchase the leased premises
for the sum of Thirty Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($32,-
500.00) exercisable by notice to Lessor.
398 F.2d at 592.
3. The proper characterization of this typical lease clause is problematic. It has been
said that the promise does not always create a true option. 1A CoRBi oN CoNrrACIS
S 261A at 485 (2d ed. 1963). Nevertheless, for ease of discussion in the present context,
the provision will be referred to as an option and as a right of first refusal. A typical
provision was interpreted in Shell Oil v. Blumberg, 154 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1946).
If Lessor at any nine during the term of this lease should desire to sell said
property to a prospective purchaser, able, willing and ready to buy the same,
Lessor shall so notify Lessee. Said notice shall give the name and address
of the prospective purchaser and be accompamed by an affidavit by the
Lessor that such prospective offer is bona fide, and the Lessor intends to sell
and convey said property. Lessee shall thereupon have the right and option
to purchase said property at the price and upon the terms offered by the
prospective purchaser.
154 F.2d at 252.
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CLAY AND BLUMBERG
The divergent interpretations of dual option provisions are best
illustrated by two leading cases, Sinclazr Refinng Co v. Clay4 and Shell
Oil Co. v. Blumberg.5 In Blumberg, the lessee bargained for typical
dual option privileges. The fuel oil company succeeded in retaining
the right to purchase the leased premises at any time during the term of
the lease for a fixed price of $10,000. In addition, Shell retained a right
of first refusal which obligated the lessor to inform lessee of any bona
fide third party offers to purchase the demised premises. Upon such
notice from lessor, Shell was afforded first refusal rights to purchase the
realty on the same terms as those offered by the third party The con-
tract also provided that "[1] essee's failure to exercise any option hereto
contained shall not in any way affect this lease or the rights of Lessee in
the estate hereby created." 6 V.
When lessor gave notice of a bona fide offer from a third party pros-
pective purchaser, Shell declined to exercise its right of first refusal,
specifically stating that such election was. made without prejuidice to
any of its other rights under the lease. Lessor consummated the sale :(for
$25,000) to the. third party, who took a warranty deed subject to
Shell's rights under the original recorded lease.
Three years. later, still during the term of the lease, Shell wrote to
the purchaser and informed him of Shell's election to exercise its out-
standing fixed price option to purchase the premises at the-$10,000
figure. The purchaser refused to recognize Shell's right to purchase the
premises, at the $1,0,000 price, and Shell commenced action in the 'federal
district court for declaratory judgment, praying for specific perform-
ance of the fixed price provision. In an unreported decision, .the c56ift
refused Shell's prayer for relief and said Shells option rights were ex-
tinguished bkr tle prior gale following its election not to exercise the
contractual right of first refusal.7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court reasoning:
The. [purchase option],. standing alone, confers upon appellant an
4. 102 F Supp. 732. (ND. Ohio 1951), affdem.,.194 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1952).
5. 154 F.2d 25L (5thCir.1946).
6. Id. at 252.. Similar ,provisions appear. m all. reported demsions.,constri .ng the
dual purchase ,o9ign instrument as -used by domestic oil -companies, It should. bs, noted,
however, that minor variations m the language used in such clauses can be,,qK.cial to
a proper disposition of rights created in the lease. .I; -:
7. Cf. Manasse v. Ford, 58 Cal. App. 312, 208 P 354 (1922); Harding v. Gibbs, 125
I1. 85, 17 N.E. 60 (1888). , T"'"
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option to purchase the premises for $10,000 during the term of the
lease, but the [right of first refusal] limts or modifies the [pur-
chase option]. Upon the notice to [Shell] of a bona fide prospec-
tive sale, and upon its being given the opportunity to exercise its
option to purchase the property at the same price offered, and
[Shell's] refusal to purchase, the [purchase option] lapsed. There-
after [Shells] remaining rights were under the [right of first re-
fusal] paragraph.8
The court explained that Shell Oil retained its right of first refusal,
so that Shell could buy from the appellee-purchaser for the same price
offered by a subsequent offerer, but that its fixed price purchase option
rights were extiguished. To justify its conclusion, the circuit court
pointed to contract language9 and cited the following "general rule"
When the lessee is given the first privilege of purchasing the
premses, he must, after notice from the lessor of the receipt of a
bona fide offer, elect to exercise his privilege in accordance with
the terms of the lease or the right is lost. °
This statement may be a valid characterization of property law, but it
is submitted that the rule was not intended to-and does not-embrace
situations where contracting parties have made express contrary provi-
sions. Where parties to a recorded instrument provide for continuing
rights to run with the land, the rule used by the court seems inapplicable.i'
It is recognized that the application of such reasoning in Blumberg would
- $. 154 F.2d at 252-53.
9. The -court construed the sentence "Lessee's failure to exercise any option hereto
contiined shall nor in any way affect this lease or the rights of Lessee in the estate
hereby created." It held that this sentence, which appeared immediately after the
clause creating the right of first refusal, operated only to reserve the first refusal right
and not the fixed price option right. 154 F.2d at 253. Apparently, the court reasoned
by negative implicatton-since the clause reserving future rights appeared only after the
first refusal clause, and since no such clause was included after the fixed price option
clause,,the fixed price option was not intended to survive a sale to a third party. It
is submitted that this interpretation was much too restrictive. The broad language of
the sentence indicates very clearly that the parties intended to preserve all of the
lessee's rights even after lessee declined to exercise the right of first refusal. Lessee's
option rights should be considered an integral part of the estate that was created by the
lease instrument. Lessee's estate was intended to survive any sale to third party pur-
chasers.
10. id. at 253. The court quoted from 3 TiiompsoN ON REAL Popm_.rr § 1329 at 492
(1-959),
11. A later court properly invoked a different rule of property law which clearly is
applicable to such problems. See discussion of the Sinclair case, note 12 rnfra and
accompanying text.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
have had a harsh effect on the third party purchaser. (He would have
been forced to sell for $10,000 property which he had just purchased
for $25,000.) However, if the integrity of contractual agreements and
recorded instruments is to be maintained, such a result seems warranted.
The original parties to the lease had agreed that lessee's options would
"9not in any way" be affected by a sale to a third party This provision
was contained in a recorded instrument, and, indeed, the purchaser took
lessor's warranty deed with actual knowledge of Shell's rights under
the lease.
In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Clay,'12 normal dual option provisions were
included in a lease of realty for the operation of a neighborhood filling
station. As in Blumberg, the lessee retained the right to purchase the
demised premises for a fixed price at any nine during the term of the
lease and reserved the normal right of first refusal.
Lessor sold the premises to a third party after Sinclair had declined
to exercise its right of first refusal. Five years after the sale, lessee notified
the new owner of its intention to exercise the fixed price option. The
new owner immediately solicited other, higher, offers from interested
parties and demanded that Sinclair match the higher offers pursuant to
the first refusal provision in the original lease. Sinclair asserted its right
to purchase the fee for the amount of its fixed price option and brought
an action seeking specific performance of that provision. At trial, lessor
argued the Blumberg reasoning and contended that the fixed price option
was extinguished after Sinclair declined to exercise its right of first re-
fusal. Although the court distinguished the Blumberg decision,13 its
persuasive holding seems to reject the Blumberg reasoning outright:
Purchase option agreements in leases are not separate and distinct
offers which can be withdrawn before acceptance. The giving
and acceptance of an option to buy is enforceable and the land-
lord does not have the right to refuse to carry out hus agreement
after the lessee exercises his option in accordance with the terms
of the lease. Furthermore, such option is a covenant which runs
12. 102 F Supp. 732 (N. D. Ohio 1951), aff'd mem., 194 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1952).
13. The Clay court discussed Blumberg without criticism, but added that "the court
there was not announcing a general principle of law to govern purchase options.
. " 102 F. Supp. at 734. It is interesting to note that the clause used in Clay to reserve
lessee's future rights was only slightly more specific than that used in Blumberg. In
Clay, the contract provided that if lessee declined to exercise the right of first refusal,
" Lessor may thereafter sell said premises to the party making the offer; subject, how-
ever, to this lease and to the leasehold estate herein granted, and to the extension and/or
additional purchase options, if any, herein granted to Lessee." Id. at 734-35.
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'with the land and a grantee of the lessor is bound by the terms
of the covenant.14
THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION
A host of other decisions in recent years demonstrate that the con-
flicting approaches illustrated by Blumberg and Clay have not been re-
solved authoritatively, so that the dual option lease continues to be
plagued with an aura of uncertainty The Supreme Court of Connecti-
cut, for example, has extended the Blumberg reasoning to its logical limt.
In Texaco, Inc. v. Rogo'w,15 that court held that a lessee's fixed price
purchase option could be exercised only before notce of a bona fide 1'
offer from a third party 17 Upon receipt of such notice, it was held that
lessee's only remaining rights were embodied in the right of first refusal
provision.'8
14. Id. at 734, citing 3 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1325-30 (1959) [Emphasis
supplied].
15. 150 Conn. 401, 190 A.2d 48 (1963).
16. The "bona fide" nature of a third party offer seldom has required lengthy dis-
cussion in reported decisions. It should be noted, however, that the requirement is
important, and can be determinative of the rights of the parties to a dual option instru-
ment.
For example, in Imperial Refineries Corp. v. Morrissey, 254 Iowa 934, 119 N.W.2d
872 (1963), lessor apparently understood the significance of the first refusal pi ovision
well enough to have solicited third party offers in order to force lessee to act on its
options. The highest "offer" received was from lessor's son, and lessor sought to force
lessee to exercise the first refusal option by matching the son's offer, which was $15,000
hugher than any other offer. The court held, inter alia, that the evidence showed that
the son's offer was not bona fide and consequently did not affect the relationship be-
tween lessor and lessee.
The requirement that the offer be bona fide also can be of procedural importance.
Since many plaintiffs seek equitable relief m connection with dual option instruments,
the lack of a bona fide offeror could support a motion to dismiss the controversy based
on "clean hands" Moreover, in a declaratory judgment context, the absence of a bona
fide offer could support a motion to dismiss based on an argument that no contro-
versy has ripened and that plaintiff merely is seeking an advisory opinion.
17. This result also obtained in Northwest Racing Ass'n v. Hunt, 20 IlI. App. 2d
393, 156 N.E.2d 285 (1959), but that decision was controlled by specific contract
language providing that lessee's failure to exercise the first refusal option would ex-
tinguish all other option rights.
18. Texaco's contract gave it the right to purchase the land during the term of the
lease for $16,000 and a right of first refusal. Upon learmng of a third party offer to
purchase the property for $44,000, Texaco notified lessor of its election to exercise its
fixed price option to purchase for $16,000. In Texaco's sit for specific performance of
that provision, the court held:
Under the circumstances, it would be unreasonable to hold that, if a lessee
is given notice of an offer [from a third party] and refuses to exercise a
1972]
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On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently
allowed a lessee to exercise its contractual fixed price option after re-
ceipt of a bona fide third party offer. In Shell Oil v. Prescott, 9 the
court said "Shell's right under the fixed price option was not lirmted
or modified in any manner by the. right of first refusal." 20
In Prescott, the court clearly adopted the reasoning of Clay More
unportandy, the Prescott court examined the general purpose of the
dual option provisions realistically Apart from minor variations in
contract language,21 it is clear that divergent judicial conclusions con-
cerning the purpose of the dual option provisions is the single most im-
portant factor which gives rise to seemingly inconsistent results. Without
exception, courts interpreting the provisions have recognized that their
duty is to discern the intent of the parties to the lease when it was
executed. 22
first refusal option it can thereafter purchase the property at
$16,000 despite a prior sale of it to the offeror named in the nonce.
The plaintiff's fixed price option could be effectively exercised, prac-
tically speaking, only prior to the plaintiff's receipt of a notice from the
defendant of a valid and bona fide offer from a third party.
190 A.2d at 52. Of all the decisions construing the dual option lease, this is perhaps
the most objectionable. It is discussed with disapproval in 1A Comm ON CONMACrS
§ 261B at 30 (2d ed. 1963, Supp. 1971). A proper reading of the contract indicates not
only that Texaco should have been allowed to exercise the fixed price option against
lessor, but also that Texaco could have exercised the option against the third party
who offered to purchase the property for $44,000.
The contract provided that "[alny option herein granted shall be continuing and
pre-emptive, binding on the lessor's heirs, devisees, administrators, executors, or assigns
and the failure of lessee to exercise same in any one case shall not affect lessee's right
to exercise such option in other cases thereafter arising during the term of the lease."
190 A.2d at 50.
19. 398 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1968).
20. Id. at 594. Interestingly, the standard lorm lease which was the subject of
the Prescott litigation was different from the Shell Oil contract which was interpreted
m Blumberg. The Prescott lease was more explicit than that in Blunberg; presumably,
it was drawn specifically to avoid recurrences of the Blumberg decision.
21. See Annot., 8 AJ..R.2d 604 (1949), and cases discussed therein. Several cases have
recognized.that varying contract language can dictate different results in construing the
dual option lease. For example, in Texaco, Inc. v. Rogow, 150 Conn. 401, 190 A.2d 48
(1963), it was said that "[slince such contracts, although often generally similar, are
worded differently and executed .under varying circumstances, a decision interpreting
and construing one contract is far from controlling in a case involving another." 190
A.2d at 51.
22. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Prescott, 398 F.2d 592, 593 (6th Cir. 1968), where the,
court noted that its duty was to ascertain the intent of the parties by construing the
contract as a whole and giving effect to every part of. the instrument.
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In this regard, the Prescott court's statement that the fixed price
option "was not limited or modified" by the right of first refusal points
the way to an understanding of the fundamental problem of interpreting
the proper interplay of the two option provisions. The import of
Prescott lies in its recogmtion of the fact that the two option provisions
operate independently, and that neither provision is intended to limit
or modify the lessee's rights under the other provision 23 Although the
courts in Rogow and other similar decisions did not address themselves
to this issue specifically, their holdings implicitly reject the Prescott
reasoning.
The courts in Blumberg and Rogow viewed the right of first refusal
as a qualification of lessee's option to purchase during the term of the
lease for a stated price. Their interpretation is that the dual purchase
provisions grant lessee an indefeasible right to purchase the dermsed
premises at any time during the term of the lease, subject to lessor's re-
tamed right of alienation to a bona fideofferor if lessee elects not to
match the third party offer. This construction interprets the right of
first refusal as a provision intended to benefit lessor as well as lessee, by
allowing lessor to sell the property under liited circumstances unen-
cumbered by the lessee's fixed price option rights. The courts in Pres-
cottand Clay, on the other hand, conclude that both option provisions
were inserted for the sole benefit of the lessee.24 According to this view,
the right of first refusal merely affords extra protection to the optionee-
lessee in the event that the lessor demonstrates a willingness to sell the
property 'for a price less than that provided in the fixed price contract
term. In that situation, under Prescott and Clay, the lessee could exercise
his right .of first refusal in order to purchase the land at whatever price
lessor would accept from a bona fide offeror. If the third- party offer
were higher than the fixed price option amount, the Prescott rationale
would allow the optionee to exercise lus fixed price option rather thah
the right of first refusal.25
23, See note 20, supra and accompanying text.
24. It has been said that "a purchase option i§ largely for the benefit of the-optionee
-and must be construed with this fact in mnd.". Sinclair Refining Co. v. Allbritton,
.147 Tex. 468, -, 218S.W.2d 185; 188 (1949) . . ' 
25. The Rhode Island'Supreme Court has articulated this iterpretauion,of the inter-
-play ,of the two provisions very clearly. In,Bfitler vRichardson; 74 RI.- 344-60'A.2d
-718 (I948), for example, the court stated: -
[Tlhe question here is what- effect tus provisi~n for a first refusal: h~s. if " -
--any,. upon-theprovision for -a- fixed price--opuon. -1.: I1t has no-effec-"
whatever. The right of option remains unimpaired. UntiL-the nine pre4;.,
1972-3
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The Prescott-Clay rationale seems to be supported by a realistic ap-
preciation of the negotiations which precede lease agreements in the
fuel oil industry The mere fact that the two option provisions appear
on standard forms prepared by the oil companies should alone suggest
that both provisions were intended to operate for the benefit of the
lessee.2 6 It is also important to note, however, that the lessee's desire to
include the provisions is commercially justifiable. As a factual matter,
the oil companies generally construct filling station facilities on leased
sites shortly after execution of the lease instrument. The company's in-
vestment in permanent improvements is enhanced by the protection
that the options afford against a sharply rising local real estate market.
It is imperative that the oil company-lessee protect against the poten-
tiality of prohibitive rental rates before investing in costly improve-
ments.27 If the lessee did not have the option to purchase during the
term of the lease, he would be in the unenviable position of having to
renegotiate the lease after its expiration from an inferior bargaining
position-he would have to pay whatever rent the lessor demanded, or
else abandon his investment in improvements.
scribed for its exercise expires, the [lessor] cannot sell for any amount with-
out [lessee's] consent. However, the provision for a first refusal may
nevertheless serve a useful purpose. It provides a means whereby [lessor],
if [he] desired, could induce an acceleration of [lessee's] decision to pur-
chase by affording [lessee] an opportunity to purchase at a price more ad-
vantageous to [lessee] than the price fixed in the option. Of course the pro-
vision could not serve this purpose if the offer was at a higher price, and
consequently it is inconceivable that the parties in agreeing to the pro-
vision could have contemplated any offer except one that was lower than
[the amount of the fixed price option]. We are of the opinion, therefore,
that the provision for a first refusal should be construed m that light not so
much as an alternative to the provision for an option but rather as a
supplement thereto.
60 A.2d at 722. The Clay court affirmed this reasoning, stating that: "[T]he first refusal
option becomes a device by which lessor could induce an acceleration of Sinclair's
decision to purchase by affording it an opportunity to purchase at a price more ad-
vantageous to it than the fixed price in the option." 102 F Supp. at 735.
26. The fact that the contract generally is prepared by the lessee might suggest that
any ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the lessor. It is submitted, however, that
the recognized purpose of an option-to benefit the optionee-negatives the principle
that ambiguities in a contract be resolved against the drafter of the instrument. Cf.,
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Allbritton, 147 Tex. 146, -, 218 S.W.2d 185, 188 (1949).
27. In Texaco, Inc. v. Rogow, 150 Conn. 401, 190 A.2d 48 (1963), for example, the
oil company built a service station on the leased site at a cost of $12,000. In Shell Oil Co.
v. Boyer, 234 Ore. 270, 381 P.2d 494 (1963), $18,000 was spent on improvements by lessor.
These figures do not include the time and effort expended by the lessee to begin the
operation of a new station.
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The practical result of the Prescott-Clay rationale is that lessor could
never sell the property for an amount greater than the fixed price option
price. (Presumably, no well-advised third party purchaser would be
willing to pay a price higher than the amount of the lessee's outstand-
ing fixed price option.) The courts in Blumberg and Rogow balked at
such a result. Itis interesting to note, however, that Professor Corbin
seems satisfied with that result. In his latest treatise, he said:
That is exactly the purpose for which the option was purchased
and paid for. That factor largely determined the amount of the
rental paid to the lessor. It is that factor that gave security to the
lessee in erecting buildings and making permanent improvements.
It is that factor that makes it fair and reasonable for the lessee to
enjoy the increase in market value, an increase caused by the in-
provements and by the lessee's successful operation of the station
as well as by population and business growth.28
This view of the first refusal provision-that it supplements rather than
qualifies the fixed price option-is consistent with Prescott and Clay,
and seems to comport with the practical realities of the lease bargaining
situation and the intent of the parties to the lease.
CONCLUSION
Decisions in recent years have shown that the dual option lease instru-
ment remains unclear in judicial interpretation. For obvious reasons, it
is important that the provisions be construed authoritatively to provide
certainty to the legal relations of parties to such instruments.
A proper understanding of the objectives of the lessor and the lessee-
oil company lead inevitably to the conclusion that the oil company has
a legitimate interest to protect-his investment in improvements-when
entering into a lease with a local landowner. This interest can best be
protected by use of the dual option provisions.
If the Blumberg and Rogow interpretation of the provisions is ac-
cepted, however, the oil company plainly would be stripped of the pro-
tection it sought to ensure.29 The Rogow court's view of the right of
28. 1A CoBiN m CoNTRAcrs § 261B at 31 (2d ed. 1963, Supp. 1971)
29. As noted earlier, the Rogow decision was particularly disturbing. See note 17,
supra, and accompanying text. It may be surmised, however, that the court there recog-
nized its departure from traditional principles of contract law. Texaco sought specific
performance, and the court stated that, "[sipecific performance is not a matter of right
. but lies m the legal discretion of the court." 190 A.2d at 53. In arriving at what it
believed to be an equitable result, however, the court pursued at least one inquiry that
1972]
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first refusal as a limitation on the fixed price option would render the
latter provision ineffectual and thus should be rejected. The Clay and
Prescott reasoning correctly applies sound principles of contract and
property law. Moreover, unless the lessor is able to prove that he failed
to understand the terms of the agreement when it was executed,"0 the
Clay-Prescott rationale clearly comports with the intention of the
parties to the agreement.
With this foundation, it is submitted that the dual option provisions
are susceptible of only one viable interpretation: The dual option pro-
visions are not inherently inconsistent or complex, and should not be
subject to attack for want of clarity 31 When properly interpreted, the
seems wholly inappropriate. The court discussed present fair market value of the sub-
ject property, apparently ignoring the well-established principle that any determination
concerning adequacy of an option price should be made as of the date the contract was
executed. Imperial Refineries Corp. v. Morrissey, 254 Iowa 934, 119 N.W.2d 872 (1963).
Thus, the court's discussion of present market value was misleading and inappropriate;
in many instances, such an inquiry could operate to negate the bargained-for protection
that lessee sought to preserve by the use of the dual provisions.
30. Although several litigants have urged varying interpretations of the option pro-
visions, rarely has a party clained that he did not understand the lease that he signed.
In Shell Oil Co. v. Boyer, 234 Ore. 270, 381 P.2d 494 (1963), the lessor claimed he did
not understand that the lease included a purchase option, even though he had signed
the instrument and had separately initialled the option price. The court heard evidence
of lessor's assertion, but held in favor of the lessee oil company The court said,
"[Lessors'] denial that they understood the option cannot be taken seriously." It added:
'The lessors failed to prove that they did not understand the purchase option." 381
P.2d at 497 The court's conclusions with respect to such controversies also merits
discussion. It concluded that "one who assents to a plain statement in an instrument
should not later be heard to say that he did not understand what he was agreeing to,
unless there is some evidence in addition to his own assertion of facts which would make
it mequitable to hold him to his agreement." 381 P.2d at 498. Since some risk of
market fluctuation is an essential part of any option bargain, it is submitted that the
court's view is correct. Frequently, controversies concerning the option provisions
ripen several years after the execution of the lease in question: a lessor could be
tempted to complain that he did not understand the importance of the option granted,
especially after the market has risen substantially Thus, the burden of proof should
rest with the lessor, and he should be required to bring forth evidence in addition to
his own subjective assertions. The Boyer decision was approved in 1A CORBIN ON CON-
TRAcrs § 261B at 32 (2d ed. 1963, Supp. 1971). The treatise did not agree, however,
with Boyer dicta to the effect that "the fact that [lessor was] mistaken about the
meaning of the option to purchase, if it were a fact, would not provide a.legal basis
for refusing to enforce it." 381 P.2d at 497
31. Some litigants have argued that the two provisions, when contained in the same
lease instrument, are per se too ambiguous to support an action for specific enforce-
ment. The argument uniformly has been rejected. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Boyer,
234 Ore. 270, 381 P.2d 494 (1963); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Viering, 404 Ill. 538, 89 N.E.2d
39g (1949); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Ajlbritton, .147 Tex. 468, 218 S.W.2d 185 (1949).
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provisions ensure the kind of protection that is essential to a lessee
contemplating substantial investment in inprovements on the rented
realty. The two provisions are intended to operate independently;"2
if the right of first refusal is read as a limitation on the fixed price
option, the lessee's interests would be impaired substantially, and the
fixed price option could be rendered meaningless. Accordingly, a
lessee's election not to exercise his contractual right of first refusal
should not impair his rights under the fixed price option, especially where
contract language specifically provides for continuing rights in the
optionee. The fixed price provision is a true option-it is a unilateral
offer, supported by consideration, that cannot be withdrawn by the
lessor during the option period. As parts of a recorded instrument that
imposes a burden on realty, the promises embodied in the option provi-
sions should run with the land;33 thus, the lessee should be allowed to
assert the same rights against subsequent purchasers that he could have
asserted against the original lessor. To the extent that Blumberg, Rogow,
and other similar decisions frustrate this reasoning, those decisions
should be rejected.
32. Logically, the Rogow rationale can be supported only if it is assumed that the
right of first refusal should be given precedence over the fixed price option. This
assumption was rejected specifically in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Allbritton, 147 Tex.
468, 218 S.W.2d 185 (1949), where the court said: "[W]e consider it good au-
thority that the 'Purchase Refusal' article is not to be given precedence over or even
equal dignity 'with the 'Purchase Opton' article, but is to be regarded merely as a
-supplement to the latter." 218 S.W.2d at 189. (Emphasis supplied).
33. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lemmon, 94 RJ. 509, 182 A.2d 306 (1962) '(purchase
option is an integral part of the lease and is a covenant that runs with the land uness
the language of the lease indicates that the parties meant the covenant to be purely
personal).
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